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Abstract
The international community’s narrative of the Malian conflict (2012-2015) is overly simplistic.
The United Nations, France, and the US focused solely on the terrorist aggression facing Mali
and other West African states after the fallout of the Arab Spring—to the detriment of the Malian people’s needs and long-term stability. This paper presents Malian, West African, and African perspectives in contrast to the Westernized narrative, in order to critically analyze the 2013
French intervention in Mali and the under-studied effects of colonial history in contemporary
action in the Sahara-Sahel region. The paper juxtaposes the proclaimed “success” of the French
counterterrorism intervention against the historical injustices of colonialism and the continuing
effects of neocolonialism on development and inequality within and among states. This paper
cautions against allowing states, such as France, to exert unrestrained military power for counterterrorist aims without considering the legality and necessity of such action in the context of
each state. In the specific case of Mali, the French intervention prevented the resolution of the
Kel Tamasheq rebellion against the Malian government and precluded regional powers from
taking on the role of primary intervening authority, which continues to affect the resolution of
violence and the integrity of the state.
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Introduction
The 2012-2015 Malian conflict encapsulates the shortsightedness with which states and
international institutions respond to internal disputes with widespread humanitarian, political,
and security implications. Mali and the greater Sahara-Sahel region still face extremist threats
and instability resulting from this conflict and connected volatile situations. Evaluating the
factors that provoked the initial outbreak of conflict with those factors perpetuating instability
throughout the Sahel in 2019 can inform potential solutions to this and similar conflicts. In
this particular context, one of the central factors of the conflict is the historical background
of the Malian state, which was a French colony from 1892 to 1946. French colonial rule had
created a system that formally excluded people living in the northern regions compared to the
southern regions that ultimately precipitated the 2012 conflict. Despite the clear connection
between French colonial rule and the French intervention, analyses of the conflict and resulting
intervention do not accurately portray the primacy of the historical ethno-political division
in leading the northern Kel Tamasheq people to rebel against the Malian government in 2012.
Western, and specifically European and American, responses to violence in Mali ignored the
complexity of the national situation, choosing instead to focus on the terrorist groups that
capitalized on the rebellion to infiltrate Mali’s northern region and establish operational bases.
This essay thus presents the historical and political context of the Malian conflict and analyzes
regional and legal debates of France’s third-party intervention.
It is necessary here to acknowledge that my own experiences and educational
trajectory has been within a primarily Western-oriented context. Where this essay attempts to
differentiate between Westernized narratives of sovereignty, violence, and peacebuilding, I, as
the author, have been limited to solely researching local African perspectives.
Overall, this essay discusses France’s influence in Mali and in West Africa in the twentyfirst century with a specific emphasis on Mali’s colonial history and France’s current interests
in West Africa. The primary contribution that this discussion makes is to build a connection
between modern norms of counterterrorist operations and neocolonialist actions of exerting
political, economic, or military influence over an independent state. This connection can
potentially inform future analyses and critiques of third-party military interventions, as well
as influence changes to the international security framework. This essay concludes that the
French government, when executing the 2013 military intervention in Mali, not only violated
Mali’s sovereignty on the grounds of counterterrorism, but superseded regional authority
over the conflict’s resolution in order to expand French military influence in the Sahara-Sahel
region.
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The 2012 Malian Conflict
The conflict began on January 17th, 2012, when a northern separatist group called the
National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) rebelled against the government,
located in the southern city of Bamako (Thurston, 2013). The government, headed by President
Amadou Toumani Touré, quickly lost territorial control and authority to this rebellion, which
was comprised primarily of ethnic Kel Tamasheq (sometimes referred to as “Tuareg”) people
(Bergamaschi & Diawara, 2014). This ethnic group and its insurgents claimed independence
from southern Mali on the basis of historical disunity and institutional inequality between the
Sahara (north) and Sahel (south) regions of the state (Heisbourg, 2013).
The map in Figure 1 shows the territory of Azawad that the MNLA wanted to become
independent, as well as important cities that played a role in the conflict, such as Gao,
Timbuktu, Mopti, and Bamako (Heisbourg, 2013).
Presidential elections were scheduled for April 2012 with the purpose of replacing
Touré. Before this could occur, Captain Ahmadou Sanogo of the Malian military, frustrated
with the government’s inability to prevent the northern rebellion, successfully led a coup
d’état against the Bamako government on March 21, 2012 (Heisbourg, 2013). Soon after the
coup, the Algerian government led conflict resolution talks in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso
and installed a transitional government with the head of Mali’s national assembly, Dioncounda
Traoré, as temporary president (Stigall, 2015).
In April 2012, the MNLA moved south and conquered the major cities of Gao, Kidal,
and Timbuktu in its pursuit to gain complete control of the northern half of Mali (Stigall,
2015). The MNLA claimed independence of Azawad on April 6, 2012 (A Touraeg State at our
Borders, 2012). In the following weeks, Islamic extremist groups, including Ansar al-Dine, the
Movement for Uniqueness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM), took primary control of the north from the MNLA while both integrating
and fighting amongst each other (Marchal, 2013). The Algerian government continued to
facilitate peace in Mali, together with the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) led by the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré (“Member States,” 2012). In
July 2012, ECOWAS asked the United Nations to permit a regional intervention in Mali and
secure peace, but the UN’s forces were prevented from intervening until September 2013 when
the situation had drastically deteriorated (“Member States,” 2012). Further clashes occurring
closer to Bamako in January 2013 provoked an international response to release the capital’s
one million inhabitants from Islamic extremists control (Chivvis, 2016). As a result, France led
a rapid-response military intervention on January 11, 2013 (Bannelier & Cristakis, 2013). This
intervention consisted of approximately 4,500 French troops under the name Operation Serval
(Bannelier, 2013; Charbonneau & Sears, 2014). The operation’s military aims were “to secure
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Bamako, stop the terrorist offensive, strike the enemy’s rear bases and prepare for the arrival
of African forces” (Heisbourg, 2013, p. 11). ECOWAS forces arrived eight days after the French
intervention and helped liberate the northern towns that were under extremist control on
January 20, 2013 (Heisbourg, 2013).
Under ECOWAS, Algerian, and Mauritanian leadership, the preparations for
democratic elections began immediately after control was established in the north. Ibrahim
Boubacar Keïta was elected the new President of Mali in August 2013, and the country began
implementing conflict resolution actions with invested regional governments and nonterrorist internal actors (Bøås, 2013). The French maintained a military presence after the new
government was in place; then they transitioned into a regional counterterrorism operation on
July 13, 2014 called Operation Barkhane (Bannelier & Cristakis, 2013). Amidst this transition,
a reconciliation process occurred between the Bamako government and the northern groups
that remained separate from the violent extremist groups. On May 15, 2015, the Coordination
of Azawad Movements, the Platform of Armed Groups, and the Malian government signed
a peace accord, officially ending the internal conflict and providing guidelines for democratic
elections of local representatives throughout the entire state (Nyirabikali, 2015).

Overview of Existing Literature and Importance of this
Paper
The bulk of the literature regarding foreign involvement in Mali takes a Western
perspective of the Malian conflict and the French intervention. This “Westernized” approach
takes for granted theories about state formation, sovereignty, and institutional capacity from
the Westphalian tradition, wherein states have a monopoly on the use of force. Due to a lack of
contextual understanding, no Western-oriented scholar comprehensively presents the Malian
conflict along its various axes: national-international, international-regional, ethnic-political,
local insurgents-Islamic extremists, northern Mali-southern Mali, colonialism-neocolonialism,
and terrorism-counterterrorism. Therefore, an analysis of the decolonization process from a
non-Western, African-centered perspective enables greater understanding of the disconnect
between the international community’s and West African interpretations of internal conflict
dynamics and the 2013 French intervention.
The Western-oriented literature mentions the conflict’s complexity, but does not
distinguish between the conflict’s internal aspects and the regional forces driving the
terrorist groups into Mali. Some Malian scholars question the French military’s intentions
as a neocolonialist intervention with inevitable, long-term repercussions, as a result of
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this oversight. Neocolonialism, defined for the purposes of this essay as political coercion
and indefinite military occupation of a sovereign state, informs African scholars’ views of
French involvement in the Sahara-Sahel. Africa’s intellectual tradition incorporates historical
experiences of colonization and contemporary understanding of neocolonial economic,
political, and social policies that protect international actors’ interests. Neocolonial policies
can be implemented in areas that were never formally colonized, but neocolonialism is
still foundationally connected to the process of decolonization. Decolonization includes
recognizing oppressive policies and seeking to establish independently-controlled political,
economic and social systems. This essay presents the regional analysis of the French
intervention in contradiction to the Western-dominated narrative of the positive merits of
third-party interventions against terrorist threats. In the interest of validating the African
governmental sovereignty and authority, this essay demonstrates the negative implications of
prioritizing counterterrorism norms over resolving internal conflicts within the international
security structure.

Historical and Political Context
French Colonial Rule and Decolonization
In 1892, France took control of the territory that includes present-day Mali and parts
of Mauritania, Senegal, Niger, and Burkina Faso, and administered the region as French
Soudan (Ghosh, 2013). The colonial government administered French Soudan from the
more environmentally-hospitable Sahel area, while the northern Sahara area remained
semi-undefined, collectively administered with three other European powers, and ruled by
local groups (Sèbe, 2013). The nomadic Kel Tamasheq revolted against all French efforts to
consolidate Kel Tamasheq, Songhai, Fulani, and Bambara people into a confined territory
(Lecocq, 2014). In exchange for political support, the French allowed the northern Kel
Tamasheq to enslave Black and Arab southern groups that they considered racially and
ethnically inferior (Harmon, 2014). The Kel Tamasheq still rebelled against the colonial state in
1916 and 1962, securing the ire and distrust of the French government (Harmon, 2014).
The independence movement between 1946 and 1968 resulted in the French Soudan’s
northern groups coming under the control of the post-colonial democratic Malian government
(Harmon, 2014; Sèbe, 2013). Modibo Keïta, the first president of Mali, thus blamed the 1963
Kel Tamasheq rebellion on the French because the French had politically supported the Kel
Tamasheq’s feelings of superiority and potential for autonomy during the colonial period
(Harmon, 2014). French sympathies toward the northern nomadic populations, along with
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“uncontrolled socio-economic and cultural disruptions, stemming from inadequate political
systems,” remained a legacy of the colonial period (Harmon, 2014, p. 214). Many Malians refer
to this legacy when explaining the continued tensions between northern and southern groups
in the present (Sèbe, 2013).
During the Algerian independence movement towards the end of the colonial
period, France’s indiscriminate violence and torture campaigns led sympathetic African
leaders, including those in Mali, to unite against French attempts to maintain colonial-era
hierarchies and underdevelopment, thereby creating the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) (Maiangwa, 2013). After gaining independence, Mali, Algeria,
and other Francophone countries used both violence and regional economic collaboration to
expel French influence and power from North and West Africa. Despite calls for democracy
and economic liberalism in the immediate post-colonial period, Bruno Charbonneau claims
that the participation of African soldiers in the French colonial military had distorted the line
between “colonizer” and “colonized,” ultimately making violence acceptable in colonial spaces
(2013). This violence—contextually defined as both an act that destroys and “a pedagogical
tool that works to control narratives of space and identity and as a politically enabling device
that affects agency”—favored continued French military presence in North and West Africa
(Charbonneau, 2013, p. 111 & 85). African leaders had few resources to consolidate and secure
their newly defined territories against internal and external threats to sovereign unity other
than collaborating with the French military, thereby affirming the permanent influence of the
French military in independently sovereign states (Charbonneau, 2013). The Republic of Mali’s
admission to the United Nations on September 22, 1960 and inclusion into Western narratives
of state sovereignty ultimately reinforced France’s military bases—or “collaboration”—among
fellow UN member states in Africa (Joly, 2013).
A similar situation occurred in Chad in the 1980s. Upon the Libyan occupation of
Chad, France launched Operation Épervier (“Sparrow Hawk”) and brought 1,200 troops to
N’Djamena, the capital of Chad (Stapleton, 2013). Even after the Organization of African Unity
helped establish a ceasefire, the French stayed in Chad and prevented a transfer of power
from Hissène Habré to Idriss Déby (Stapleton, 2013). They ultimately allowed Déby to take
power, but many internal and external actors accused the French government of dismissing the
needs of Chadians so that an authoritarian leader could maintain power for France’s benefit
(Maclean, 2018). By supporting this leader, French troops were able to remain in Chad and
maintain a military base at N’Djamena.

Postcolonialism in the Twenty-first Century: Security Policy and
Counterterrorism
Tony Chafer describes French postcolonial policy: “French governments under the Fifth
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Republic adopted a multi-layered approach to maintaining the special relationship with
Africa, combining an array of ‘official’ policy instruments with a complex range of unofficial,
family-like, and often covert ties” (2018, para. 48). France’s system of official and unofficial
postcolonial relations with former colonies facilitated the expansion of foreign military
operations in the global counterterrorism movement of the early 2000s, starting with
intelligence operations against Mokhtar Belmokhtar and other individuals connected to AlQaeda in 2002 (Hammer, 2018). In the contemporary context, France justifies its pre-positioned
troops and military capacity to intervene under the United Nations’ notions of necessarily
providing support to states deemed incapable of maintaining sovereignty and control.
Critics and scholars conceive of French military involvement as part of the broader
contemporary era, in which international institutions such as the United Nations can revoke
states’ sovereignty when deemed necessary. One scholar asserts that after 9/11 and the United
States’ push for a global “war on terror,” a redefinition of sovereignty emerged, whereby states
have to adhere to certain counterterrorism obligations in order to remain sovereign states
(Ramos, 2013). The argument for sovereignty as the definitive aspect of a state’s freedom to act
within its own boundaries is an inherently Western construction of state capacity and violence.

Debates in International Law on Military Interventions
Challenging Western notions of sovereignty in a non-Western context underlies
debates on France’s motivations and legal grounding for intervening in the Malian conflict.
It is important to note that even when accepting the validity of international intervention to
combat global terrorist threats, international law does not support the French intervention.
The two international legal principles that are typically cited in justification of the French
intervention in Mali are first, the Malian government formally inviting France to intervene,
and second, the UN Security Council passing a resolution allowing multilateral forces to
intervene in the conflict (Bannelier, 2013). Karine Bannelier and Theodore Christakis (2013)
take these legal principles in tandem to support the legal intervention of France in the Mali
conflict, also claiming that either of these two principles provide sufficient justification when
applied individually. In contrast, Dan Stigall (2015) suggests that the French government relied
on contestable principles of international law that governed third party military intervention.
Stigall’s argument stems from different interpretations of “intervention by invitation” and the
United Nations Security Council’s “implied authorization,” which he says are “less defined” in
international law, especially in the use of military force (2015, p. 223).
First, the Malian government’s invitation cannot stand as sufficient grounds for the
French intervention. International law explicitly states that external intervention by invitation
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is unlawful when “the objective of this intervention is to settle an exclusively internal political
strife in favour of the established government which launched the invitation” (Bannelier, 2013,
p. 870). Before the French intervened, their support of the Malian government in Bamako was
explicit within UN Security Council Resolutions 2012 and 2085, which laid out support for
“the Armed and Security Forces of Mali” under the “authority of the State of Mali” (Stigall,
2015, p. 51). Debates on the French intervention generally conclude that the democratic
elections that France encouraged in 2013 were not fully legitimate, because rebelling groups
and displaced persons were excluded from voting (Blyth et al., 2013). It is also important
to note that ECOWAS leaders agreed to prevent the Interim President Dioncounda Traoré,
the Prime Minister, and other members of the transitional government from contesting the
2013 presidential election; this undermined Dioncounda Traoré’s legitimacy as president.
The Malian government’s questionable legitimacy in 2012 and 2013, due to the coup d’état
and the lack of free, fair, and transparent democratic elections supports the conclusion that
the invitation to intervene was meant to import legitimacy to the state government over all
internal actors—extremist or rebellious. Thus, while international law may allow third parties
to intervene in internal conflicts at the request of the legitimate government, the limit to
Traore’s presidency imposed by ECOWAS and other West African leaders negates the French
government’s justification for deploying troops to Mali in January 2013.

The French Intervention as Neocolonialist
Soon after French troops were deployed to Mali in January 2013, then-president
François Hollande (2013) noted in a television broadcast that the French military intervened in
Mali in order to support the Malian army against the terrorist aggression that was threatening
“all of West Africa.” Hollande references the movements of AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar al-Dine
throughout the Sahara-Sahel, but makes no mention of the non-extremist insurgent groups
such as the MNLA. Thus, he ignores Mali’s internal rebellion and assumes that all extremist
groups had universal objectives within Mali and the broader region. His statement more
closely represents France’s colonial experience in attempting to quell any group opposing
state authority than an accurate understanding of group dynamics within Mali in 2012. The
French government and international communities held incorrect beliefs, primarily that since
2012 all armed groups existing in Mali are Islamic extremist groups with broad strategic
interests in the region and the world. Furthermore, French security policy in Mali mirrors prior
French military engagement in Algeria and in Chad. In both instances, references to African
“tribes” or religious affiliations of participating groups “convey already formed explanations
to understanding the conflict thus an implicit programme of action that a priori authorizes
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violence”(Charbonneau, 2014, p. 118). The focus on combatting ideological extremism was
easily extrapolated to target all armed groups within Mali.
The Kel Tamasheq and the MNLA were conceived as part of the “terrorist threat” in
Mali due to the persistent French colonial stereotype that the Kel Tamasheq are “a war prone,
nomad, and anarchist population” (Lecocq, 2014, p. 90). Though research on the Malian
conflict specifies that the rebel groups do not all represent radical Islam or violent extremist
groups, or the objectives of violent extremist groups seeking to impose Sharia law, this belief
remained part of the French narrative (Marc, Verjee, & Mogaka, 2015). Religious extremism
in West Africa had been rising throughout prior decades, and it did not specifically or
intentionally cause the Mali conflict (Harmon, 2014). In fact, the extremists’ strict interpretation
of Islam is at odds with local tradition in the Sahara-Sahel, and there was no documented
proof that the armed groups in Mali were homogeneous just because they were “homegrown”
(Sèbe, 2013; Marc, 2015) .When the French intervened in 2013, the armed groups were still
undergoing internal changes, including splintering into different factions and joining with
other local groups, and the internal conflict was unresolved (Stigall, 2015).
The international community condoned the French intervention on behalf of the
Malian government through the counterterrorist narrative, which unjustifiably homogenized
the armed groups actively engaged in Mali. Joshua Hammer (2018) notes that some Malians
attacked the overall French intervention as neocolonialist, “and lashed out at former president
Nicolas Sarkozy for his central role in the NATO attacks that had unseated Qaddafi [in Libya]
and destabilized the region” (p. 197). Malian author Aminata Dramane Traoré (2013) wrote
of the French insistence on military intervention: “Paris has just sent to the Security Council a
resolution in support, he claims, at the request of the interim president, Dioncounda Traoré,
for a military intervention in the North […] the planned deployment will be African only in
name, since it was designed to serve the interests of France in the Sahel” (p. 92-93) . This and
other Malian perspectives of the conflict recognize France’s historical and current imposition
into Mali’s national affairs, as well as Western powers’ culpability in sparking the “terrorist
aggression facing all of West Africa”. These perspectives were overlooked at the moment of
intervention.
After intervening, the French transitioned Operation Serval into the broad
counterterrorism effort Operation Barkhane, thereby reinforcing Malians’ criticism regarding
France’s neocolonial, long-term interests. Heisbourg believes that when the French were
calculating the cost-benefit of intervening, Mali was most likely seen as a “convenient location
for positioning forces in the relatively low-cost ‘light footprint’ mode which has served France
so well” in protecting its economic, financial, and political interests and investments in West
and North Africa (2013, p. 10). Traoré wrote again to her friend Boubacar Boris Diop two days
after French troops landed in Mali, stating: “They have simply stolen our country from us,
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Boris. I am Malian and I say forcefully and loudly that they have stolen Mali, under the pretext
of protecting it from jihadists”(2013, p. 127). Like Traoré, many Malians were aware of the need
for security during the 2012 conflict and the subsequent power struggle over northern Mali,
but they neither wanted nor accepted prolonged French occupation (Traoré and Diop, 2013).

Regional Responses to the 2012 Conflict
Powerful actors in North and West Africa, the African Union, ECOWAS, and regional
hegemons like Algeria and Nigeria had active interests in Mali. ECOWAS (along with
support from non-ECOWAS members Algeria, Chad, and Mauritania) was prepared to
deploy approximately 3,300 troops to support a multilateral United Nations stabilization
and peacekeeping force in October 2012 (Fomunyoh, 2013). Though Algeria, Mauritania,
Chad, Libya, Morocco, and the fifteen ECOWAS members had collaborated on a resolution
outlining such objectives at an October 2012 conference, the UN Security Council claimed that
information about a regional military force’s objectives and means was lacking. Consequently,
the UNSC refused to authorize an ECOWAS or African Union-led peacekeeping or operational
force (United Nations Official Document: Resolution 2056, 2012). UN Resolution 2085 came
close to authorizing force in Mali in December 2012, calling on all member states to “provide
coordinated assistance” to Malian forces in the fight to maintain the territorial integrity of
the state and to hamper the threats posed by terrorist organizations (Stigall, 2015). Though,
this resolution only uses the phrase “all necessary means” in reference to the African-led
International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) as a potential military force (Stigall, 2015).
This phrase is typically accepted as the legal and principled justification for third-party
military interventions, but the French military never received such clearance.
Algeria and Tunisia openly rejected the 2013 French deployment because both
governments feared protracted French involvement in the region, and they also had concerns
that a French-led intervention would inspire retaliation against Western powers or Westernaffiliated North African governments (Ammour, 2013). France’s push for hasty elections in
2013, as discussed earlier, also demonstrates its political neocolonialist agenda; the French
government benefited from a Malian state with the semblance of a democratic government
that agreed to ongoing French military presence. Senegalese author Boubacar Boris Diop
summed up the French intervention, writing in June 2013, “of all the European powers, France
is the only one to have never been able to resign itself to decolonize and Operation Serval will
evidently comfort it in its reactionary stubbornness” (p. 132).
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Aftermath and Ramifications
Hollande and the French government mitigated international concerns outside of
Africa over any neocolonialist intentions by establishing counterterrorism as the primary
motivation for intervening in Mali. Operation Barkhane was viewed as a reorganization of
France’s prepositioned troops in Africa, and it addressed the expanded territory in which
terrorist groups operated (Hicks, 2017). Although 1,000 French troops were planning to remain
in Mali under Operation Barkhane, Hollande only met with the governments of Cote d’Ivoire,
Niger, and Chad to discuss plans for Operation Barkhane’s expansion (Fini Serval, Voici
Barkhane, 2016). The French government continued to dictate plans to the Malian government
without taking into account the Malian citizens’ open belief that “the question of the North is,
obviously, the most urgent to resolve. Detonator of the crisis, it remains the main threat to its
settlement” (Le Mali Après Serval : éviter La Rechute, 2014). By ignoring the internal conflict,
the French intervention gave power to the Malian government and shut down dialogue with
armed groups in the north and real peace talks with all representatives of northern Mali (Le
Mali Après Serval : éviter La Rechute, 2014). The argument for counterterrorism consumed the
French and Malian governments and prevented any legitimate contest of state authority.

Policy Recommendations
The French and Malian governments’ simplified analysis of the terrorist groups’ threats
to Mali’s boundaries excluded numerous voices from the national decision-making structure.
The current Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta must increase the representation of all
political, ethnic, economic, religious, and social groups within the government—as long as the
state maintains control over security solutions. The question of northern Mali and its major
ethnic groups’ claims to autonomy, including the Kel Tamasheq, the Songhai, Arabs, and the
Fulani, necessitates a reconsideration of Mali’s national identity to accommodate the rights of
all ethnic, religious, political, and social groups.
As Mali reconfigures its internal affairs in relation to various groups, international,
regional, and national actors must revisit the details of the 2012 conflict, the northern
rebellion, and Mali’s capabilities in addressing remaining terrorist groups. Jonathan Sears
recommends that any assistance given to Mali, including political, economic, developmental,
or military, also “appreciates Mali’s dynamic and sometimes contentious indigenous social
regulation mechanisms” (Sears, 2013, p. 444). The French government must also acknowledge
its turbulent history in West Africa and the illegality of the Malian intervention, in order to
transition from military assistance to other forms of aid, because its military does not have the
full consent of each represented group in Mali to remain. Following the rationale for removing
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the French military from Mali, any future French monetary or political assistance to the state
“should not assume that the authority of the Malian nation-state is uncontested, particularly in
light of Mali’s regional, urban, rural, and identity-based cleavages” (Sears, 2013, p. 445). France
can still assert its national interests by combatting terrorism in the Sahara-Sahel through
recognized “soft” counterterrorism methods, such as programs that attempt to de-radicalize
individuals and promote economic stability (Khalfan, 2016). France’s colonial history must
always factor into contemporary action in North and West Africa.
The Malian case demonstrates the need for more effective collaboration among
regional authorities when crises occur. In order to build on the recommendation for increased
representation, North and West African authorities and the African Union should expand
their current institutions to include representatives who can attest to various groups’ needs
and claims. Nevertheless, in order for these institutions to act efficiently and effectively,
the international community and the United Nations must accord these bodies with legal
mandates to use “all means necessary” when agreed upon by the states in question, the
African Union, and the representative bodies. Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger already
have political mechanisms with regular consultations at the ministerial level, intelligence
mechanisms, and military mechanisms (Okereke, 2016). These countries are also in the process
of implementing a regional security strategy, developed at the 2011 high-level conference on
Security, Development and Partnership, but they will need external support and recognition
to act without oversight or intrusion from international actors (Okereke, 2016). Thus, the
efforts made to address regional security and development concerns should be prioritized
and supported by external partners. Regional bodies at the national and local level will
be most effective at adequately representing the needs of West African peoples and states,
and the international community must forgo any further stereotyping of these nations as
underdeveloped or without recourse to address regional, national, and local issues just to
justify military, political, and economic intervention.

Conclusion
As this essay has demonstrated, the Malian conflict includes more complex
dynamics than terrorist threats and general instability. The French government’s continued
simplification of the security concerns in West Africa has ramifications for counterterrorism
operations and third-party military interventions in sovereign states. In taking control of
the stabilization process in Mali, the French government hinders national and regional West
African abilities to institute long-term order throughout the Sahara-Sahel. With continued
French presence in West Africa, the greatest threat facing West African states is local, national,
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and regional backlash to French neocolonialism and militarization of the region. The policy
recommendations above are beginning steps for Mali, France, and African authorities to
replace the pattern of neocolonialism with accountability, equal representation, and resilience.
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Notes
“La France, a la demande du president du Mali et dans le respect de la charte des Nations
Unies, s’est engagée hier pour appuyer l’armée malienne face à l’aggression terroriste qui
menace toute l’Afrique de l’Ouest”. [France, at the request of the president of Mali and in
respect of the United Nations Charter engaged in war yesterday to support the Malian Army
against the terrorist aggression that menaces all of West Africa].
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